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Putting the Brakes on the Preventive State:
Challenging Residency Restrictions on Child Sex
Offenders in Illinois under the Ex Post Facto
Clause
Michelle Olson
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government‘s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom
are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.1
¶1

State laws restricting where convicted sex offenders can legally reside first came
into common use in the mid-1990s.2 Since then, a number of states and municipalities,
including Illinois, have implemented restrictions prohibiting sex offenders3 from living
within certain distances from schools, parks, and other areas where children gather.4
These prohibited distances range from 500 to 2000 feet,5 and often encircle multiple
entities within a community. As a result, sex offenders are often severely limited as to
where they can legally reside. These laws have forced some offenders to remain in
prison6 or live in makeshift tent cities because there is nowhere else for them to live.7 In
Georgia, for example, state probation officials advised sex offenders to live in a muddy
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1
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
2
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) (1998); DEL. CODE tit. 11, §
1112 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (1995); GA. CODE § 42-1-13(b) (1996).
3
Each state has its own list of crimes that subject an individual to the label of ―sex offender‖ or ―child sex
offender.‖ In Illinois only child sex offenders are prohibited from living within 500 feet of schools,
playgrounds, daycares and other areas where individuals under age 18 gather. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/119.3(b-5) (2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.4(b-5) (2010).
4
See generally Chiraag Bains, Next-Generation Sex Offender Statutes: Constitutional Challenges to
Residency, Work, and Loitering Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483 (2007); Justin H. Boyd,
Comment, How To Stop A Predator: The Rush To Enact Mandatory Sex Offender Residency Restrictions
and Why States Should Abstain, 86 OR. L. REV. 219 (2007) (collecting various sex offender laws).
5
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE U.S. 139–141 (Sept.
2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers-0 (listing residency laws in
different states).
6
Megan Twohey, St. Leonard Closes Doors to Sex Offenders, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 6, 2009,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-12-06/news/0912050317_1_offenders-halfway-nursing-homes.
7
Homeless Georgia Sex Offenders Ordered out of Woods Camp, FOXNEWS.COM, Sept. 29, 2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,556300,00.html.
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camp on the outskirts of the county until they could locate a legally permissible home.8
In Florida, some sex offenders were forced to live under a remote bridge because they
could not find housing that complied with the county‘s residency law.9 In Illinois, 1000
sex offenders are currently eligible for parole but the state refuses to release them from
prison because they cannot secure suitable housing.10 These are but some consequences
of the increasingly strict regulatory scheme confronting sex offenders in the United States
today.
This Comment explores whether a viable challenge to residency restrictions on
child sex offenders in Illinois exists under the ex post facto clauses of the federal and
state constitutions. It also recounts the history of sex offender regulation in Illinois and
explores the social and political environment that fostered the emergence of residency
restrictions in the state. Part I provides a brief overview of the history and purpose of the
ex post facto clause. It also highlights the recent resurgence of preventive lawmaking;
that is, laws that work to prevent crime rather than detect and investigate it, and laws that
impose direct restraints on the liberty of those considered particularly dangerous by the
state. Part II briefly recounts the legislative history of sex offender regulation in Illinois,
and provides an overview of the political and social realities that shaped the legislative
debate. Part III uses recent state court decisions in Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky to
evaluate the constitutionality of residency restrictions on child sex offenders in Illinois,
ultimately arguing that such restrictions violate the ex post facto clauses of the federal
and state constitutions. Finally, this Comment concludes by considering the need for
judicial intervention given the resurgence of the preventive state.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE AND THE PREVENTIVE STATE

¶3

Both the U.S. Constitution and the Illinois Constitution contain ex post facto
clauses that prohibit Congress and the various state legislatures from passing laws that
impose or increase punishment for criminal acts after those acts are committed.11 The
U.S. Constitution contains not one, but two, explicit ex post facto prohibitions, ―mak[ing]
clear the Framers' near obsessive concern over the threat of retroactively-designed
laws.‖12 Alexander Hamilton, for example, considered the ex post facto prohibitions
contained in the Constitution among the ―greate[st] securities to liberty and
republicanism.‖13 James Madison claimed that ―ex post facto laws . . . are contrary to the
first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.‖14 One
leading delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Judge Oliver Ellsworth, went
so far as to say that an explicit Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation
8

Id.
John Pain, Miami Sex Offenders Get OK To Live Under a Bridge—Law Makes Housing All But
Unobtainable, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 2007, at 4.
10
Twohey, supra note 6.
11
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (―No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.‖); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1
(―No state shall enter into any . . . ex post facto Law.‖); IL CONST. art. I, § 16 (―No ex post facto law, or
law impairing the obligation of contracts or making an irrevocable grant of special privileges or
immunities, shall be passed.‖).
12
Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1261, 1275 (1998).
13
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
14
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
9
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was unnecessary because ―there was no lawyer, no civilian who would not say that ex
post facto laws were void of themselves.‖15
The location of these clauses within the Constitution itself additionally
demonstrates the importance of the prohibition. According to scholar Breck McAllister:
That it was considered necessary to include [two ex post facto clauses] in
the original Constitution is a commentary upon the importance attributed
to them by the Framers. Such matters as freedom of religion, freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, etc., came later in the first ten amendments
and then only as restraints upon the federal government.16

¶5

¶6

The ex post facto provision contained in Article I, Section 10, however, applied directly
to the states.17
The language of Illinois‘ ex post facto clause mirrors that of the Federal
Constitution and Illinois courts interpret the state‘s ex post facto prohibition in lock step
with the United States Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the Federal Ex Post Facto
Clauses.18 Thus, the same parameters that constrain Congress‘s ability to act also
constrain the Illinois legislature‘s ability to do the same.
The Federal Constitution, however, fails to clearly define the scope of its ex post
facto prohibitions, making their application difficult at times. The United States Supreme
Court first considered what types of laws should be prohibited as ex post facto laws in the
1798 case of Calder v. Bull.19 The Court concluded that the federal ex post facto
prohibitions applied only to criminal, not civil, laws; and the Court defined four types of
criminal laws that the Ex Post Facto Clauses were designed to prevent.20 These
categories, which still hold true today, include:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and

15

Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders’ View, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 489, 515 (2003)
(quoting RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 376 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)).
16
Breck P. McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court of the United States, 15 CAL. L. REV.
269, 269 (1927).
17
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
18
Barger v. Peters, 645 N.E.2d 175, 176 (Ill. 1994) (―[T]he drafters of our modern constitution intended the
Illinois ex post facto clause to do no more than conform to the Federal Constitution's general prohibition on
the States. Thus, in construing this State's constitutional provision, we are without a basis to depart from
the Supreme Court's construction of the Federal ex post facto clause. And, in fact, this court has long
interpreted our own constitutional provision in step with Supreme Court pronouncements.‖) (internal
citation omitted).
19
3 U.S. 386 (1798).
20
Id. at 390, 399.
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receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.21
¶7

¶8

According to McAllister, ―This oft-quoted dictum is a recognition that the phrase
ex post facto is a technical one, to be filled by the court with an esoteric meaning.‖22
Today, however, there are three generally accepted reasons for prohibiting ex post facto
laws.23 The first is to provide fair warning of the law‘s effect.24 The second is to ensure
proper reliance on the law.25 And the third is to provide a check on legislative power.26
This third reason was of particular concern to the Framers because the Framers
―commonly regarded ex post facto laws . . . as weapons of tyrants and despots used to
achieve politically motivated results.‖27 By denying Congress and the state legislatures
the ability to use these weapons, the Framers hoped to limit the abuse of government
power directed at political enemies.28 Additionally, ―[b]y disallowing retroactive
retributive measures completely, the Framers prevented legislatures from using [these
measures] against any particular group.‖29
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized the importance of the Ex
Post Facto Clauses in keeping legislative power in check. Upon considering the types ex
post facto laws feared by the Framers, the Court observed in Calder that:
The prohibition against . . . ex post facto laws was introduced for greater
caution, and very probably arose from the knowledge, that the Parliament
of Great Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass such laws. . . . The
ground for the exercise of such legislative power was this, that the safety
of the kingdom depended on the death, or other punishment, of the
offender: as if traitors, when discovered, could be so formidable, or the
government so insecure! With very few exceptions, the advocates of such
laws were stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive
malice. To prevent such, and similar, acts of violence and injustice . . . the
Federal and State Legislatures, were prohibited from passing any bill of
attainder; or any ex post facto law.30

¶9

Both the Framers and the United States Supreme Court, therefore, recognized early on
the need to limit the legislature‘s power to retroactively punish its citizens.
Throughout history, the Federal Ex Post Facto Clauses have served to cabin the
punitive powers of the state. For example, the United States Supreme Court has used the
Ex Post Facto Clause to strike down state legislation requiring teachers, lawyers,
21

Id. at 390 (emphasis in original).
McAllister, supra note 16, at 271.
23
See Note, Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1491, 1496–1498 (1975)
(outlining the theoretical justifications for prohibiting ex post facto laws).
24
Id. at 1496.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 1498.
27
Id. at 1500.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 389 (1798) (emphasis in original omitted).
22
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clergymen, and others to take an ―Oath of Loyalty‖ denying allegiance to the
Confederacy before continuing to work in their chosen profession;31 to prohibit states
from retroactively extending the statute of limitations for past sexual offenses;32 and to
prohibit states from applying revised sentencing guidelines to individuals who committed
their crimes prior to the guidelines‘ effective date.33 Implicit in these decisions is the
recognition that it is fundamentally unfair to retroactively punish individuals for their past
actions, and to do so exceeds the bounds of the punitive state.
¶10
But today, to use a phrase coined by Carol Steiker, the preventive state, not the
punitive state, is ―all the rage.‖34 In the preventive state,35 ―the paradigm of
governmental social control [shifts] from solving and punishing crimes that have been
committed, to identifying ‗dangerous‘ people and depriving them of their liberty before
they can do harm.‖36 According to Steiker, the expansion of the preventive state is
particularly evident in two areas of law.37 The first area involves giving the police more
authority to prevent, as opposed to detect and investigate, crime. For example, laws that
allow police to search people without individualized suspicion,38 to stop and frisk people
without probable cause,39 or to order suspected gang members to disperse from a loitering
group.40 Another area where the expansion of the preventive state is evident is in the
emergence of laws that impose direct restraints on the liberty of those considered
particularly dangerous by the state. For example, pre-trial detention laws, sex offender
registration and community notification statutes, and civil commitment laws, which allow
the indefinite commitment of certain sexual criminals.41 In both of these areas of law, the
traditional role of the state has expanded from that of punisher to that of preventer.
¶11
The rise of the preventive state is a relatively recent phenomenon. According to
Steiker, ―The preventive state became possible only as the [twentieth] century
progressed, with the invention of modern police forces and total institutions like the
prison, the mental hospital and the home for juvenile delinquents.‖42 As a result, the
limits of the preventive state are less defined than those of the punitive state, which the
Framers actively debated and directly incorporated into the Constitution.43 Again,
according to Steiker:

31

Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866).
Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003).
33
Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987).
34
Carl S. Steiker, Forward: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771, 774
(1998).
35
―State‖ in this context refers to sovereign governmental power, not one of the fifty states.
36
Eric Janus, The Preventative State: Terrorists and Sexual Predators: Countering the Threat of a New
Outsider Jurisprudence, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 576, 576 (2004).
37
Steiker, supra note 34, at 774–776.
38
See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (upholding a limited protective sweep of a house by police).
39
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (upholding the search of a person without probable cause provided
the police have reasonable suspicion that the person had committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime).
40
See Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997) (striking down the City of Chicago‘s gang loitering
ordinance, which allowed the police to order individuals to disperse if the officer believed the group
contained at least one gang member, as void for vagueness).
41
Steiker, supra note 34, at 775–776.
42
Id. at 778.
43
Id.
32
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At the time of the drafting and ratifying of the Constitution, the dangers of
the punitive state were well known. Thus, the Founders were careful to
include in our foundational text . . . references . . . to particular criminal
processes and protections in order to cabin appropriately the punitive
power of the new federal government.44
Further:
The limits of the punitive state have been explored extensively (if not
resolved successfully) both by courts and legal commentators. In contrast,
courts and commentators have had much less to say about the related topic
of the limits of the state not as punisher (and thus, necessarily as
investigator and adjudicator of criminal acts) but rather as preventer of
crime and disorder generally.45
¶12

There are, however, some limits that currently exist on powers of the preventive
state. The United States Supreme Court has concluded, for example, that the law may not
single out one group of people for disfavored treatment based solely on race.46 The Court
has also established a hierarchy of liberty interests, and afforded greater protection to
those rights considered ―fundamental.‖47 Finally, the Court has instituted a strict set of
criminal procedures to limit the government‘s ability to deprive suspected criminals of
privacy and liberty.48 As a result, according to Eric Janus, ―[t]he government‘s efforts at
radical prevention have, in the last half century, [been] met with diminishing success, as
the courts have erected some important constitutional bulwarks against excessive
erosions of liberty in the name of prevention.‖49
¶13
But, recent sex offender laws threaten to undercut this progress. According to
Janus, ―by re-introducing and re-legitimizing the concept of the degraded other,‖ recent
sex offender laws ―rationalize a degraded system of justice, in which the normal
protections of the Constitution do not apply.‖50 The next section recounts the emergence
of sex offender laws in Illinois, and considers the rise of the preventive state as it relates
to sex offender regulation in the state.
II. SEX OFFENDER REGULATIONS IN ILLINOIS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE
¶14

The statutory scheme regulating non-institutionalized51 sex offenders in Illinois is
comprised of three basic components: the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), which
44

Id.
Id. at 773–774.
46
Janus, supra note 36, at 582.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 576.
50
Id.
51
This Comment discusses only those laws that affect sex offenders once they are released from prison.
Illinois also has a civil commitment program for sex offenders. The Sexually Violent Persons Commitment
Act allows the indefinite civil commitment of those sex offenders considered most likely to re-offend. 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1 (2010).
45
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requires convicted sex offenders to register certain personal information with the state;52
the Sex Offender Community Notification Law (SOCNL), which requires the State
Police to make sex offender information available to the public via the Internet;53 and
Sections 5/11-9.3(b-5) and 5/11-9.4(b-5) of the Illinois Criminal Code (―Illinois‘
residency statute‖ or ―Illinois‘ residency law‖), which prohibits child sex offenders from
residing within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds, child care institutions, daycares and
facilities providing programs or services directed towards persons under eighteen years of
age.54 SORA and SOCNL apply to all sex offenders,55 whereas the Illinois‘ residency
statute applies only to child sex offenders.56
¶15
A sex offender is an individual who has been convicted57 of at least one of over
thirty different sex crimes.58 Generally, a child sex offender is a sex offender who
committed his or her sex crime against a person under age eighteen.59 Both types of
52

Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1 (2010).
Sex Offender Community Notification Law, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/101 (2010).
54
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5) (2010); id. at 5/11-9.4(b-5).
55
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(A)–(C); id. at 152/105.
56
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5); id. at 5/11-9.4(d)(2.5).
57
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(B). An individual is required to register as a sex offender if he or she is
found not guilty by reason of insanity of a registerable offense; is the subject of a finding not resulting in an
acquittal of a registerable offense; is convicted or adjudicated for a violation of federal law, the law of
another state, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or a foreign country law that is substantially equivalent
to a registerable offense; is a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for any registerable offense; or is an
individual adjudicated as being sexually dangerous or sexually violent. Id.
58
Id. at 150/2(B)–(C). A felony or misdemeanor conviction of any of the following offenses requires
registration as a sex offender: child pornography, aggravated child pornography, indecent solicitation of a
child, sexual exploitation of a child, custodial sexual misconduct, sexual misconduct with a person with a
disability, soliciting for a juvenile prostitute, patronizing a juvenile prostitute, keeping a place of juvenile
prostitution, juvenile pimping, exploitation of a child, grooming, traveling to meet a minor, criminal sexual
assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, criminal sexual
abuse, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, or ritualized abuse of a child; or kidnapping, aggravated
kidnapping, unlawful restraint, or aggravated unlawful restraint when the victim is a person under eighteen
years of age and the defendant is not a parent of the victim and the offense was sexually motivated as
defined in Section 10 of the Sex Offender Management Board Act and the offense was committed on or
after January 1, 1996; or first degree murder when the victim was under eighteen years of age and the
defendant was at least seventeen years of age at the time of the offense, and the offense was sexually
motivated as defined in Section 10 of the Sex Offender Management Board Act; or sexual relations within
families committed on or after June 1, 1997; or child abduction committed by luring or attempting to lure a
child under sixteen years of age into a motor vehicle, building, house trailer, or dwelling place without the
consent of the parent or lawful custodian of the child for other than a lawful purpose, and the offense was
sexually motivated as defined in Section 10 of the Sex Offender Management Board Act, and the offense
was committed on or after January 1, 1998; or any of the following offenses if committed on or after July 1,
1999 and when the victim was under eighteen years of age: forcible detention if the offense was sexually
motivated as defined in Section 10 of the Sex Offender Management Board Act, solicitation for a
prostitute, pandering, patronizing a prostitute, or pimping; or the following offenses if committed on or
after July 1, 1999: indecent solicitation of an adult, or public indecency for a third or subsequent
conviction; or permitting sexual abuse when the offense was committed on or after August 22, 2002. Id.
59
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5); id. at 5/11-9.4(d)(2.5). Under Illinois‘ residency statute, a child
sex offender is an individual convicted of any of the following: child luring, aiding or abetting child
abduction, indecent solicitation of a child, indecent solicitation of an adult, soliciting for a juvenile
prostitute, keeping a place of juvenile prostitution, patronizing a juvenile prostitute, juvenile pimping,
exploitation of a child, child pornography, aggravated child pornography, predatory criminal sexual assault
of a child, ritualized abuse of a child; or a violation of any one of the following when the victim is under
eighteen years of age: criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, or
aggravated criminal sexual abuse; or a violation of any one of the following when the victim is under age
eighteen years of age and the defendant is not a parent of the victim: kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping,
53
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offenders must register with local police, but, as discussed below, only child sex
offenders are restricted as to where they may legally reside.
A. Sex Offender Registration
¶16

The first component of Illinois‘ regulatory scheme was introduced and adopted in
1986. The Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act (HCSORA) required ―habitual‖
child sex offenders to register with police within thirty days of their release from prison
and remain registered for ten years.60 Only four sexual offenses warranted registration
under HCSORA,61 and registration was required only after the conviction of a second or
subsequent offense.62 Failure to register with police was a Class A misdemeanor,63
punishable by less than one year in prison and up to $1000 in fines.64
¶17
As indicated by the HCSORA floor debate, lawmakers believed sex offenders
posed a serious threat to the community. According to the bill‘s chief sponsor, State
Representative Terry Parke, HCSORA was one of the most important laws the legislature
would consider that year.65 ―[W]e are having an epidemic in Illinois . . . [of] sex crimes
against our children,‖ claimed Representative Parke.66 ―We must remember that
pedophiles are compulsive and repetitive,‖ echoed State Representative Robert Regan,
―[t]hey have never been cured.‖ 67
¶18
Although HCSORA received strong support in both Houses, some lawmakers were
concerned about the liberty interests at stake. State Representative Larry Hicks claimed it
was ―wrong‖ to ―tell criminals once they‘ve been rehabilitated and have served their
time, that we‘re going to then register them and try to brand them for years to come.‖68
State Representative Anthony Young similarly cautioned:
I understand what a sensitive area this is, but at the same time I think this
House would be establishing a precedent that would be extremely
dangerous—the precedent being making someone who has served their
unlawful restraint, or aggravated unlawful restraint. Id. at 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5); id. at 5/11-9.4(d)(2.5).
60
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 221, 223, 227 (1987).
61
Id. at para. 222 § 2(B). Registerable offenses included: criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal
sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse when the offense was a felony.
62
Id. at para. 222 § 2(A). Specifically, a ―habitual child sex offender‖ was any person who, after July 1,
1986, was convicted a second or subsequent time of any of the sex offenses or attempts to commit any of
the offenses set forth in the Act. Multiple convictions resulting from the same act or from offenses
committed at the same time counted as one conviction under the Act.
63
Id. at para. 230 § 10.
64
Id. at para. 1005 § 8-3(a)(1); id. at para. 1005 § 8-9-1(a)(2).
65
H. Transcription Deb., 84th Gen. Assemb., at 208 (Ill. June 23, 1986).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 212. According to Representative Regan, requiring repeat child sex offenders to register with local
authorities would allow people to know when a sex offender who was going to offend ―again and again and
again‖ moved into their community. Id. Interestingly enough, however, the intent of the bill was not
community notification. When pressed by a fellow lawmaker about how the community would know if a
habitual child sex offender moved into the neighborhood, Representative Parke claimed that community
notification was ―not the intent of the legislation.‖ Instead, the purpose of the Act was to notify local
police, not the public, when a habitual child sex offender moved into the area; any ―information [was] to be
held in confidentiality,‖ and public inspection of registration information was strictly prohibited under the
Act. Id.; see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 229 (stating that public inspection of registration data is
prohibited, and it is a Class B misdemeanor to permit the unauthorized release of registration information).
68
H. Transcription Deb., 84th Gen. Assemb., at 216 (Ill. June 23, 1986).
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time and paid the price for the crimes they have committed . . . to register
their name and address . . . I wonder if [this bill] could withstand
constitutional scrutiny. . . . This is a bad precedent.69
Despite Representative Young‘s concerns, HCSORA easily passed the House,70
unanimously passed the Senate,71 and went into effect on August 15, 1986.72 The
modern era of sex offender registration had begun.
¶19
The next significant change to Illinois‘ registration statute came six years later
when the legislature deleted the term ―habitual‖ from HCSORA and required every child
sex offender to register with local police.73 State Representative Frank Mautino proposed
the change in response to the kidnapping and murder of six-year-old Kahla Lansing, who
lived in his district in Spring Valley, Illinois.74 Representative Mautino‘s bill created the
Child Sex Offender Registration Act (CSORA), which required those convicted of any
one of five sexual offenses to register with local police after their first conviction.75 It is
unlikely, however, that CSORA would have prevented Lansing‘s death because her
attacker did not live in Illinois and therefore would not have been required to register
with the state. Lansing‘s attacker was simply passing through Illinois when he kidnapped
her.76 Nevertheless, CSORA passed both chambers unanimously with no debate.77 Two
years later, the legislature amended the law to require that all sex offenders, not just child
sex offenders, register with local police.78
¶20
In the ensuing years, the Illinois legislature greatly expanded the list of sex offenses
that warranted registration. By 2007, according to Ed Yohnka of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), the list ―ha[d] grown so much . . . it‘s probably an open
question as to whether it‘s still a useful tool for law enforcement.‖79 Today, over thirty
different crimes require registration as a sex offender.80 The law requires most sex
offenders to register annually for the ten years following their release, but more violent
69

Id. at 212.
Id. at 217 (passing by a vote of ninety-seven aye, seventeen no, and one present).
71
S. Transcription Deb., 84th Gen. Assemb., at 137 (Ill. May 23, 1986).
72
1986 Ill. Laws 1467 (codified as amended at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1–10 (1994)).
73
Child Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1–2 (1994).
74
S. Transcription Deb., 87th Gen. Assemb., at 52 (Ill. June 18, 1992).
75
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(B)(1) (1994). An individual convicted of any of following offenses was
required to register as a child sex offender when the victim was under eighteen years of age: criminal
sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse when the offense was a felony,
aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Id. at 150/8; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9.3 (1994).
76
People v. Rissley, 651 N.E.2d 133, 137 (Ill. 1995). Repeat child sex offender Jeffery Rissley confessed
to and was convicted of Kahla Lansing‘s death. Rissley was passing through Spring Valley, Illinois on his
way to Michigan when he lured Lansing into his truck and sexually assaulted her. Rissley then strangled
Lansing and abandoned her in a barn in Iowa. When authorities apprehended Rissley, he admitted to two
previous sex offense convictions in Texas. He also admitted to being a pedophile who routinely sought
children as a means of relief. Matt Murray, Man Gets Death Penalty for Kidnapping, Killing Spring Valley
Girl, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 10, 1992, at 5.
77
H. Transcription Deb., 87th Gen. Assemb., at 27, 30 (Ill. May 14, 1992); S. Transcription Deb., 87th
Gen. Assemb., at 52 (Ill. June 18, 1992).
78
H. Transcription Deb., 89th Gen. Assemb., at 91 (Ill. Feb. 9, 1995) (passing House Bill 204 by a vote of
113-0); S. Transcription Deb., 89th Gen. Assemb., at 75 (Ill. Mar. 15, 1995) (passing House Bill 204,
without debate, by a vote of 56-0).
79
Kevin McDermott & Eric Potter, Rules for Sex Offenders too Tough?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr.
16, 2007, at C1.
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See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(B) (2010).
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offenders are required to register for the duration of their natural lives.81 Offenders must
not only register in those jurisdictions where they live and work, but also where they are
temporarily domiciled, which includes any place they spend an aggregate of five or more
days during one calendar year.82 Sex offenders must provide local police with the
following current information: photograph, address, place of employment, employer‘s
telephone number, school attended, county of conviction, license plate numbers for every
vehicle registered in the offender‘s name, the offender‘s age at the time of the offense,
any distinguishing marks on the offender‘s body, all e-mail addresses, instant messaging
identities, chat room identities, and other Internet communication identities that the
offender uses or plans to use, all Uniform Resource Locators registered or used by the
offender, and all blogs and other Internet sites maintained by the offender or to which the
offender has uploaded any content or posted any messages or information.83 Sex
offenders are also prohibited from using any social networking sites84 or serving as
election judges.85 Failure to register with local police is a Class 3 felony,86 which is
punishable by two to five years in prison and up to $25,000 in fines.87
B. Community Notification
¶21

In 1995 lawmakers passed the second component to Illinois‘ sex offender
regulatory scheme.88 The Child Sex Offender Community Notification Law
(CSOCNL)89 required the Illinois State Police to create and maintain a Statewide Child
Sex Offender Database and to provide certain public entities—including schools and
child care facilities—with the name, address, date of birth, and adjudication of every
registered child sex offender in the state.90 The law did not, however, require the State
Police to make this information available to the general public.91 Unlike previous sex
offender laws, CSOCNL prompted a lively debate in the legislature.
¶22
Senator Robert Molaro, for example, believed CSOCNL failed to provide a
comprehensive solution to the problem of sexual abuse in the state. According to Senator
Molaro:
This [bill] isn‘t well thought out . . . If we‘re worried about a child sex
offender living with us, what about a child murder[er]? . . . What about a
child kidnapper? Why isn‘t that in the bill? . . . Here we are again
haphazardly jumping into something because of something that happened
81

Id. at 150/7.
Id. at 150/3(a)(1)–(2).
83
Id. at 150/3(a).
84
Ray Long & Monique Garcia, Law: Sex Offenders’ Web Use is Limited, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 2009, at 13.
85
Ray Long, Laws Aim to Keep Sex Offenders from Kids, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 2008, at 2.
86
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/10(a).
87
Id. at 5/5-4.5-40(a); id. at 5/5-4.5-40(e).
88
1995 Ill. Laws 4453 (codified at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/101 (1996)).
89
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/101 (1996).
90
Id. at 152/120(a). Public entities required to receive notice of a child sex offender in their community
included: school boards of public school districts and principles of schools in nonpublic districts, child care
facilities in the county where the child sex offender lived, any person who was likely to encounter a child
sex offender, and any member of the public wishing to inspect the records at police headquarters himself.
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Id. at 152/120(a).
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in the newspaper. We have to be responsible here . . . . Everybody should
know when a sex offender comes in. But we have to be responsible and
not willy-nilly make bills that make no sense and just throw it out to the
public and say let the Supreme Court or the police departments figure this
out. We should figure it out and we should take the time to do it.92
¶23

State Representative Joel Brunsvold echoed Senator Molaro‘s concerns, claiming
CSOCNL was ―not ready,‖ and lawmakers were ―rushing to get this thing done.‖93 State
Representative Coy Pugh added:
I understand that we all need to justify our existence. But when we talk
about justifying our existence based on sacrificing the rights of the masses,
then we have to rethink our positions or even our conscience . . . . At what
point are we going to do not what‘s right for our reelection, not what‘s
right for the local newspapers, not what‘s right for our Leadership, who
may or may not know what they are doing? . . . When are we going to
base our decisions on the rightness of the matter?94

¶24

Despite the concerns of Representative Pugh and others, CSOCNL passed the
House by a vote of eighty-eight ayes, eleven nays, and fifteen present;95 it passed the
Senate by a vote of forty-eight ayes, no nays, and seven present.96 Shortly thereafter, in
an attempt to address some of the issues raised by Senator Molaro, the legislature passed
the Child Sex Offender and Murderer Community Notification Law, which required
police to notify specific public entities, such as school boards and daycare providers,
when child murderers, not just child sex offenders, moved into the community.97
¶25
In 1997, the legislature amended CSOCNL to apply to all sex offenders, not just
child sex offenders.98 Finally, in 1999 the legislature required the State Police to make
certain sex offender registration information available to the general public via the
Internet.99 Illinois‘ Sex Offender Registration Website allows users to search for sex
offenders by last name, city, zip code, county, compliance status, and crime.100 It also
allows users to map the registered sex offenders living in their community.101 As of May
2010, there were 24,347 registered sex offenders listed on the website.
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S. Transcription Deb., 89th Gen. Assemb., at 51–52 (Ill. Nov. 16, 1995).
Id. at 42.
94
Id. at 30.
95
A bill must receive a majority in both houses and be signed by the governor to become law. ILL. CONST.
art. IV, § 8. A present vote does not count towards the majority needed for a bill to become law. ILL.
CONST. art. IV, § 9.
96
S. Transcription Deb., 89th Gen. Assemb., at 61 (Ill. Nov. 16, 1995); H. Transcription Deb., 89th Gen.
Assemb., at 58 (Ill. Nov. 16, 1995).
97
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/105, 120 (1996).
98
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/105, 120 (1997).
99
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/115(b) (1999).
100
Illinois‘ Sex Offender Registration Information, http://www.isp.state.il.us/sor/sor.cfm (last visited Aug.
20, 2010).
101
Id.
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C. Residency Restrictions on Child Sex Offenders
Illinois‘ residency statute first went into effect on July 7, 2000.102 Prior to that,
Illinois law restricted where child sex offenders could loiter, but not where they could
live.103 House Bill 4045, introduced by State Representative George Scully, prohibited
child sex offenders from residing within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds, child care
institutions, daycares and facilities providing programs or services directed towards
persons under eighteen years of age.104 While presenting the bill, Representative Scully
noted that the Chicago Sun Times recently ran a cover story highlighting how Illinois law
prohibited child sex offenders from loitering, but not from living near a school.105
According to Representative Scully, House Bill 4045 was designed to remedy this
―anomaly‖ in the law.106 During debate, Representative Scully assured his colleagues
that the bill was ―quite constitutional and [did] not unreasonably restrict a person from
residing within our community.‖107 After a limited discussion, House Bill 4045 passed
the House by a vote of one hundred and ten ayes, no nays, and three present.108
¶27
The Senate debate, however, was more robust. Senator William Shaw was
concerned that the bill would prompt child sex offenders to flock to his district in
Chicago‘s south suburbs due to inadequate housing in the city.109 ―I just don‘t know
anywhere in Chicago proper that [a child sex offender] could live,‖ claimed Senator
Shaw.110 But the suburbs have ―more open space and . . . schools are farther apart.‖111
Senator John Cullerton echoed his colleague‘s concern:
¶26

In Chicago, in my district, we have Lake Point Tower . . . two, three
thousand people [live there] . . . [same with] the John Hancock Building.
Nobody could live . . . there if they ever had [a child sex offense]
conviction. It‘s just not practical . . . . It‘s tough to vote No on this bill
[be]cause of what somebody could say . . . . I‘m going to vote Present,
because . . . [this bill] needs work.112
¶28

Chief Senate sponsor Senator Patrick O‘Malley came to the bill‘s defense, stating,
―basically what we‘re saying is that these people will not be allowed to live near places
where they might be tempted to harm any of our children, whether they be in Chicago, in
102

2000 Ill. Laws 2051 (codified as amended at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1–10 (2000)).
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(a) (1998) (prohibiting a child sex offender from being present in any
school building without permission from the principal unless the offender is the parent or guardian of a
student, and prohibiting a child sex offender from loitering in a public way within 500 feet of a school); id.
at 5/11-9.4(b) (prohibiting a child sex offender from being present in a public park or loitering within 500
feet of a public park when persons under eighteen are present).
104
2000 Ill. Laws 2051 (codified as amended at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1–10 (2000)).
105
H. Transcription Deb., 91st Gen. Assemb., at 47 (Ill. Feb. 29, 2000).
106
Id. at 53. Additionally, in an attempt to head-off potential eminent domain problems, the bill included a
provision that specifically exempted child sex offenders who purchased their homes prior to the bill‘s
effective date. Id. at 50.
107
Id. at 47.
108
Id. at 53.
109
S. Transcription Deb., 91st Gen. Assemb., at 53–55 (Ill. Apr. 7, 2000).
110
Id. at 55.
111
Id.
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Id. at 60.
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the suburbs or downstate Illinois.‖113 Senator Edward Petka agreed, claiming the bill was
―a logical extension of what [the legislature had] done over the past several years in
putting up protected zones around schools and around parks.‖114
¶29
Senator James Clyborne, however, believed the bill unfairly applied to offenders
who lived in their homes before a school or daycare moved into their neighborhood.115
―They have been [in their homes] for ten years, haven‘t bothered anyone. They‘ve
registered as sex offenders. [But now] we‘re criminalizing them because [a] school [is]
built 500 . . . feet from their home.‖ Senator O‘Malley responded, claiming such a result
was warranted given the high recidivism rate among child sex offenders.116 He closed
the debate by stating:
[T]his [legislation] is one more statement to [child sex offenders] who are
predators on our children . . . [to] get out of Illinois . . . . [R]ecidivism is a
real problem with these people . . . . These are people who are, like, in a
candy shop, and let‘s keep ‗em out of the candy shop ‗cause the candy
tends to be our children.117
¶30

House Bill 4045 easily passed the Senate by a vote of fifty-three ayes and five
present.118 Governor George Ryan signed the bill into law on July 7, 2000.119 At the
time, only three other states had sex offender residency restrictions in place.120
D. Working out the Kinks

¶31

Throughout the years, Illinois lawmakers have been united in supporting tough sex
offender regulations.121 This support is likely due in part to strong public disapproval of
sex offenders. For example, a 2005 Gallup poll found that sixty-six percent of
respondents were ―very concerned‖ about child molesters, whereas only fifty-two percent
of people were as worried about other types of violent crime.122 A 1997 Washington
state survey found that the majority of respondents said they felt safer knowing where
convicted sex offenders lived.123 And a 2004 Alabama survey found that females and
parents of minor children, two key voting constituencies, were more likely than males
and non-parents to feel that community notification was important.124 According to
113

Id. at 54.
Id. at 60–61.
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S. Transcription Deb., 91st Gen. Assemb., at 57 (Ill. Apr. 7, 2000).
116
Id.
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Id. at 62.
118
Id. at 67.
119
Doug Finke, Preteens Suspected of Sex Crimes, Murder Now Guaranteed Attorneys, THE ST. J. REG.,
July 8, 2000, at Local.
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See ALA. STAT. § 15-20-26 (2000) (prohibiting sex offenders from living with 2000 feet of a school);
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quarter mile from a primary school); FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2000) (prohibiting sex offenders
from living within 1000 feet of schools and other structures where children are present).
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See supra Part I.
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The JonBenet Ramsay Case: The Greatest Fear, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 25, 2006, at 25.
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scholar Jill Levenson, ―[s]ex offenders and sex crimes incite a great deal of fear among
the general public and as a result, lawmakers have passed a variety of social policies
designed to protect community members from sexual victimization.‖125
¶32
In Illinois, sex offenders have become so despised that finding new ways to
regulate them has, according to one newspaper, become a ―rite of spring‖ for lawmakers
in the state.126 For example, in the latest legislative session alone,127 Illinois lawmakers
passed bills to: retroactively require all sex offenders, including those convicted before
SORA‘s enactment date, to register with local police;128 ban all child sex offenders from
entering public parks;129 prohibit child sex offenders from operating, managing, being
employed by or associated with any local fair when children under age eighteen are
present;130 increase the initial registration and renewal fee for sex offenders from $20 and
$10, respectively, to $100 for each fee individually;131 require sex offenders to register
within three days, not five days, of being temporarily domiciled in one location;132 and
prohibit child sex offenders from operating ice cream trucks, emergency vehicles, and
rescue vehicles in the state.133
¶33
Because there is little, if any, organized opposition to these and other sex offender
bills, there has been little political debate about the long-term effects of Illinois‘
regulatory scheme. As State Representative Roger Eddy noted, ―This is a very, very
politically charged issue . . . and anyone who comes forward with easing penalties on a
certain type of sex offender becomes an open target the next election.‖134
¶34
This lack of legislative oversight, however, has led to some absurd results. For
example, from 1996–2006 SORA required individuals convicted of kidnapping,
aggravated kidnapping, unlawful restraint, or aggravated unlawful restraint against
victims under age eighteen to register as sex offenders if the victim was not the
perpetrator‘s child. As a result, some individuals were required to register as sex
offenders even though they committed no sex crime. For example, Charles Johnson was
forced to register as a sex offender after he and four accomplices kidnapped a sixty-yearold woman and her twenty-month-old granddaughter in an attempt to extort ransom from
the woman‘s son.135 Johnson pled guilty to armed robbery and aggravated kidnapping,
125

Id. at 138.
McDermott & Potter, supra note 79.
127
Each legislative session runs for two years. The 96th legislative session began on January 1, 2009, and
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S.B. 2824, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. (Ill. 2010). This bill unanimously passed the Senate, and
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2010.
130
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currently awaits House approval.
131
S.B 1702, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010). This bill unanimously passed the House and the
Senate. It was signed by the Governor on July 19, 2010.
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S.B. 3176, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010). This bill unanimously passed both the House and
the Senate. It was signed by the Governor on July 19, 2010.
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Senate Bill 62 unanimously passed the Senate, and passed the House by a vote of 89 ayes, 14 nays, and
12 present. It was signed by the Governor on August 4, 2009. Pub. Act No. 96-0118 (Ill. 2010).
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McDermott & Potter, supra note 79.
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but because he kidnapped a child under eighteen, to whom he was not a parent, he was
required to register as a sex offender.136 Although the Illinois Appellate Court found that
Johnson‘s motive was not sexual in nature, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the state
still had a rational basis for requiring Johnson to register as a sex offender.137
Recognizing the possibility that minors kidnapped by a non-parent could be at greater
risk for sexual assault, the Court held that registration was a reasonable means of
protecting the public and was constitutional as applied to Johnson.138
¶35
In another case, the Illinois Appellate Court required a minor convicted of
kidnapping another minor for a joyride to register as a sex offender.139 Sixteen-year-old
Phillip C. was required to register as a sex offender after forcing seventeen-year-old
Miguel B. into a car at knifepoint and instructing Miguel to give him a ride.140 While he
was driving, Miguel noticed a sheriff‘s car parked on the side of the road and was able to
escape to safety.141 On appeal, the court upheld SORA‘s registration requirements as
applied to Phillip.142 While acknowledging there was ―no evidence that defendant
sexually assaulted Miguel or that his motivation in kidnapping Miguel was sexual in
nature,‖ the court believed that ―the legislature could rationally conclude that kidnapers
of children pose such a threat to sexually assault those children as to warrant their
inclusion in the sex offender registry.‖143
¶36
As a result of the bizarre outcomes in these cases and others, the legislature
amended SORA in 2006 to apply only to ―sexually motivated‖ offenses.144 At the same
time, lawmakers created a new registry to track and monitor individuals who harm
children, but whose crimes are not sexual in nature.145 The Child Murderer and Violent
Offender Against Youth Registration Act (VOYRA) requires child murderers and violent
offenders against youth to register annually with local police for ten years following their
release. The State Police also make this information available to public via the
Internet.146
¶37
VOYRA, however, does not expressly allow previously registered sex offenders to
transfer onto VOYRA‘s list, even when their crime was non-sexual in nature.147 Instead,
136
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the state‘s attorney in the offender‘s county of conviction has the sole discretion to
approve or deny the offender‘s transfer request.148 As a result, some individuals remain
registered as sex offenders despite being convicted of non-sexual crimes.149 For example,
a quick search of the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Website in May 2010 found 174
child murderers registered as sex offenders. While some of these registrants were also
convicted of a sexual offense, many were not; demonstrating the lingering results of the
ill conceived 1996 SORA amendment.
¶38
Another problem with Illinois‘ residency statute is that, like the rest of Illinois‘
regulatory scheme, it is based on the belief that sex offenders re-offend at an unusually
high rate. Recent studies, however, do not support this common belief. For example, a
2002 United States Department of Justice (DOJ) study, which tracked 272,111
criminals150 in fifteen states, including Illinois, found that 67.5% of participants were
rearrested for a new criminal offense within the first three years of their release from
prison; whereas a similar 2003 DOJ study, which tracked 9691 sex offenders in the same
fifteen states, found that only 5.3% were rearrested for a new sex crime within the first
three years of their release.151
¶39
The extreme unpopularity of sex offenders has made it difficult to challenge
Illinois‘ regulatory scheme in the Illinois courts; the Illinois Supreme Court has upheld
both SORA and SOCNL against constitutional challenge.152 The Court, however, has yet
to consider the constitutionality of residency restrictions on child sex offenders in the
state. Part III uses two recent decisions in other states to explore the validity of an ex
post facto challenge against Illinois‘ residency statute. It also considers the need for
judicial action given the resurgence of the preventive state.
III. EX POST FACTO CHALLENGE TO ILLINOIS‘ RESIDENCY LAW
¶40

The United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court have yet to
consider whether residency restrictions on child sex offenders violate the ex post facto
clauses of the United States or Illinois Constitutions. Two of Illinois‘ five appellate
courts, however, have concluded that residency restrictions do not offend federal or state
ex post facto prohibitions.153 The Illinois decisions are consistent with the overwhelming
148

Id.
See Marion Buckley & J. Michael True, “Sex Offenders” But No Sex Crime? What SORA and VOYRA
Could Mean for Your Clients, 95 ILL. B.J. 482, 485 (2007) (outlining instances where criminals are made to
register as sex offenders for crimes that are non-sexual in nature).
150
PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP‘T JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, 7 (June 2002), available at
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drug trafficking and possession), and 9.7% were convicted of a public-order offense (e.g., driving under the
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People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288 (Ill. 2004) (making sex offender registry information available via
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judicial trend to uphold residency restrictions in other states.154 Two recent cases in
Indiana and Kentucky, however, question this line of reasoning, and may signal a change
in the judicial approach to residency restrictions.155 This section considers the viability of
an ex post facto challenge to Illinois‘ residency statute, and the highlights the need for
judicial intervention given the recent resurgence of the preventive state.
A. Elements of an Ex Post Facto Challenge
¶41

A statute is a prohibited ex post facto law if it is both retroactive and
disadvantageous to the defendant.156 To fit this criteria, a law must apply to events
occurring before its enactment,157 and it must criminalize an act which was innocent
when done, increase the punishment for a previously committed offense, or alter the rules
of evidence by making a conviction easier.158 To determine whether a law criminalizes
an act which was innocent when done, a reviewing court must first decide whether the
statute in question creates a civil proceeding or a criminal penalty.159 If the legislature
intended to impose punishment, the court‘s inquiry ends; the statute is a prohibited ex
post facto law. But, if the legislature intended to create a civil, non-punitive regulation,
the court will continue its inquiry into the nature of the statute‘s effects.160 Ultimately,
the court will override the legislature‘s civil intent if ―the statutory scheme is so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate [the state‘s] intention to deem it civil.‖161
¶42
To determine the nature of a statute‘s effects, a reviewing court will likely analyze
the five factors emphasized by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe.162
These factors ask whether the regulation at issue is 1) traditionally regarded as
punishment; 2) imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; 3) promotes the twin aims
of punishment; 4) has a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose; and 5) is excessive
with respect to its intended non-punitive purpose.163 None of these factors alone is proof

2005).
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State, 960 So.2d 717 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006); Lee v. State, 895 So.2d 1038 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)
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158
Id.
159
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (citation omitted).
160
Id.
161
Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
162
Id. at 97. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the United States Supreme Court enunciated a seven factor
ex post facto test. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). In Smith, the Court found five factors ―most relevant‖ to its
analysis of Alaska‘s Sex Offender Registration Act. 538 U.S. at 97. Both Illinois courts to consider the
constitutionality of the state‘s residency statute have applied the five Smith factors, not the seven MendozaMartinez factors. People v. Morgan, 881 N.E.2d 507, 510 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); People v. Leroy, 828
N.E.2d 769, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). As such, this Comment considers only the five Smith factors deemed
most relevant by the United States Supreme Court.
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Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
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of a punitive effect, but their consideration as a whole helps the court determine whether
the statute in question is punitive or civil in nature.164
¶43
To date, both Illinois appellate courts to apply the Smith test upheld Illinois‘
residency law as creating a civil regulation, not retroactive punishment.165 In People v.
Leroy, the Illinois Fifth Appellate District held that residency restrictions did not violate
the ex post facto clauses of the United States or Illinois Constitutions as applied to
Patrick Leroy, a convicted child sex offender found living within 500 feet of a school
playground in Alton, Illinois.166 In People v. Morgan, the Illinois Third Appellate
District relied on much of the same reasoning used in Leroy to uphold residency
restrictions as applied to Jeffrey Morgan, a convicted child sex offender found living
within 500 feet of a school in Rock Island, Illinois.167
¶44
In both cases, the courts ruled that Illinois‘ residency statute created a civil remedy,
not a criminal penalty, and that the purpose of the law was to protect the general public,
not to punish child sex offenders for past offenses.168 Until recently, most courts to
consider the issue have come to the same conclusion.169 But in June 2009, the Indiana
Supreme Court held that its state‘s 1000-foot residency restriction, as applied to a
convicted child sex offender, violated the ex post facto clause of the state constitution.170
Shortly thereafter, in October 2009, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that Kentucky‘s
1000-foot residency restriction, as applied to a convicted sex offender, violated the ex
post facto clauses of both the federal and state constitutions.171 Using the Illinois,
Indiana, and Kentucky cases as a guide, this section evaluates the strengths and
weaknesses of an ex post facto challenge to residency restrictions on child sex offenders
in Illinois.
1. Threshold Inquiries for an Ex Post Facto Challenge in Illinois Court
¶45

A court reviewing the constitutionality of Illinois‘ residency law must make three
initial determinations before proceeding to consider the five factors articulated in Smith.
First, the court must determine whether the statute applies retroactively.172 Illinois‘
residency statute clearly satisfies this requirement because it applies to all convicted child
sex offenders, regardless of their date of conviction. Next, the court must consider
whether the statute disadvantages the defendant by increasing the punishment for a

164

Id.
See infra Part III.B.
166
Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 782.
167
Morgan, 881 N.E.2d at 512.
168
Id.; Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 782.
169
See, e.g., Weems v. Little Rock Police Dept., 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying Arkansas law);
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Iowa law); Doe v. Baker, 2006 WL 905368 (N.D.
Ga. 2006) (applying Georgia law); Salter v. State, 971 So.2d 31 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); Boyd v. State, 2006
WL 25832 (Ala. Crim. Capp. 2006); Lee v. State, 895 So.2d 1038 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (upholding
residency restriction statutes against ex post facto challenges); Thompson v. State, 603 S.E.2d 233 (Ga.
2004); Formaro v. Polk County, 773 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 2009); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa
2005); Hyle v. Porter, 2006 WL 2987735 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). But see Nasal v. Dover, 862 N.E.2d 571
(Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
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State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1154 (Ind. 2009).
171
Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 447 (Ky. 2009).
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People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433, 438 (Ill. 2000).
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previously committed offense.173 Illinois‘ residency statute also satisfies this requirement
because it increases the punishment for past sex crimes by prohibiting some offenders
from residing within 500 feet of areas where they were previously allowed to live based
solely on their offender status.174
¶46
Finally, a reviewing court must determine whether the legislature intended to
impose punishment or to enact a civil regulation.175 Recall that federal and state ex post
facto prohibitions apply only to criminal, not civil, laws. To determine whether the
legislature intended to create a civil regulation, a reviewing court will consider the
legislature‘s express and implied intent. 176 The United States Supreme Court affords
―considerable deference . . . to the intent as the legislature has stated it.‖177 As such,
―only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has
been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.‖178 While maintaining a strong
presumption in favor of constitutionality, a reviewing court will also likely consider the
statute‘s text, structure, and enforcement procedures to help determine the legislature‘s
intent.179
¶47
Both Illinois courts to consider the constitutionality of Illinois‘ residency statute
concluded that Illinois lawmakers intended to create a civil regulation.180 According to
the Leroy court, ―[w]here a legislative restriction is an incident of the state‘s power to
protect the health and safety of its citizens, the restriction will be considered to evidence
an intent to exercise that regulatory power, and not a purpose to add to a punishment.‖181
As a result, the court concluded that ―the intent of the Illinois General Assembly in
passing [Illinois‘ residency statute] was to create a civil, nonpunitive statutory scheme to
protect the public rather than to impose a punishment.‖182
¶48
The Illinois courts, however, paid only cursory attention to the threshold question
of legislative intent; and both failed to address the statute‘s text, structure, and
enforcement procedures, three factors other courts have found determinative.183 For
example, in considering the text and structure of Indiana‘s residency statute, the Indiana
Supreme Court ruled that by omitting a purpose statement and placing Indiana‘s
residency statute solely within the criminal code, the Indiana legislature created
ambiguity regarding its civil intent.184 The Indiana court also expressed concern that the
Indiana statute failed to exempt offenders convicted prior to the statute‘s effective date,
or those who purchased their homes prior to the statute‘s effective date.185 According to
the Indiana court, ―with a single exception, [Indiana‘s] residency restriction does not
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Id.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5) (2010); id. at 5/11-9.4(b-5).
175
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).
176
Id. at 93 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)).
177
Id.
178
Id. at 92 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100).
179
Id. at 92–94.
180
People v. Morgan, 881 N.E.2d 507, 510 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 779 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005).
181
Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 779 (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 93–94).
182
Id.
183
Smith, 538 U.S. at 92–94.
184
Id. (citing State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1149 (Ind. 2009)).
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Pollard, 908 N.E.2d at 1150.
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appear to include a civil or regulatory component.‖186 The ―single exception‖ cited by
the court was a provision that allowed some individuals to petition the court ten years
after their release to be declassified as child sex offenders.187 Based largely on this
exception, the Indiana court ―assum[ed] without deciding‖ that the Indiana legislature
intended to create a civil regulatory scheme.188
¶49
Similar to Indiana‘s residency statute, Illinois‘ residency statute is located solely
within the state‘s criminal code and does not contain a purpose statement clarifying the
legislature‘s intent.189 Although Illinois‘ residency statute does exempt offenders who
purchased their homes prior to the law‘s effective date, the Illinois law does not contain a
grandfather clause exempting those convicted of a sex offense before the statute‘s
enactment date.190 Furthermore, unlike the Indiana law, Illinois‘ residency statute does
not provide a mechanism for offenders to petition the court for declassification as a child
sex offender—the ―single exception‖ stressed by the Indiana court.
¶50
In addition to failing to address the statute‘s text and structure, the Illinois courts
also failed to evaluate the statute‘s enforcement procedures. Under Illinois‘ residency
law, a child sex offender found living in a prohibited zone is guilty of a Class 4 felony,191
which is punishable by one to three years in prison and up to $25,000 in fines.192 This is
similar to the penalty facing those who violate Indiana‘s residency law. Under Indiana‘s
residency statute, a child sex offender found living in a prohibited zone is guilty of a
Class D felony,193 which is punishable by six months to three years in prison and up to
$10,000 in fines.194 The penalties for violating the Illinois and Indiana statutes, however,
are greater than the penalty facing those found violating Kentucky‘s residency statute; a
law which the Kentucky Supreme Court held was the result of a civil legislative intent.195
Under the Kentucky statute, a sex offender found living in a prohibited zone is guilty of a
Class A misdemeanor for the first offense,196 which is punishable by up to one year in
prison197 and up to $500 in fines.198
¶51
Although Illinois‘ residency statute bears many similarities to the Indiana statute,
which the Indiana court ruled created ambiguity regarding Indiana‘s legislature‘s civil
intent, both Illinois courts to consider the issue were reluctant to infer a punitive intent
from a seemingly civil regulation. This reluctance is likely a result of the United States
Supreme Court‘s presumption in favor of constitutionality and the need for ―clearest
proof‖ before overriding the legislature‘s civil intent.199 Even courts that have held
186

Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1149 n.4.
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Id. at 1150.
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See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5) (2010); id. at 5/11-9.4(b-5).
190
See id. at 5/11-9.3(b-5); id. at 5/11-9.4(b-5).
191
Id. at 5/11-9.3(d); id. at 5/11-9.4(e).
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730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-45(a) (2010); id. at 5/5-4.5-45(e); id. at 5/5-4.5-50(b).
193
IND. CODE. § 35-42-4-11(c) (2007).
194
IND. CODE § 35-50-2-7(a) (2009).
195
Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 443 (Ky. 2009).
196
KY. REV. STAT. § 17.545(4)(a) (2009).
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KY. REV. STAT. § 532.090(1) (2009).
198
KY. REV. STAT. § 534.040(2)(a) (2009).
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Indeed, in concurring to uphold Alaska‘s registration and community notification law, Justice Souter
stated:
To me, the indications of punitive character . . . and the civil indications weighted heavily by the
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residency restrictions violate ex post facto prohibitions have refused to hold that
lawmakers enacted such restrictions solely as a means of punishing sex offenders.200 As
such, a reviewing court will likely proceed to the next step in the ex post facto analysis,
which is whether the statute in question is so punitive, either in purpose or effect, as to
negate the legislature‘s civil intent.201
2. Historically Regarded as Punishment
To determine whether a statute is so punitive so as to overcome the legislature‘s
civil intent, a reviewing court will likely apply the five factor test articulated in Smith.
The first Smith factor requires the court to determine whether the restriction at issue has
been historically regarded as punishment.202 According to the United States Supreme
Court, ―[a] historical survey [is] useful because a State that decides to punish an
individual is likely to select a means deemed punitive in our tradition.‖203
¶53
One penalty historically regarded as punishment is banishment. In United States v.
Ju Toy, Justice Brewer defined banishment as ―punishment inflicted upon criminals by
compelling them to quit a city, place, or country, for a specified period of time, or for
life.‖204 According to Justice Brewer, ―[b]y all the authorities the banishment of a citizen
is punishment, and punishment of the severest kind.‖205 In the colonial era, courtsanctioned banishments were believed to deter crime and protect the public.206 Illinois,
however, eventually outlawed the practice, finding it contrary to public policy.207
¶54
In considering the similarities between residency restrictions and banishment, the
Illinois courts concluded that Illinois‘ residency statute was not akin to the historical
punishment of banishment because it did not ban offenders from the entire community; it
simply limited where within the community certain offenders could live.208 Unlike
colonial criminals, child sex offenders are free to move about the community,
demonstrating the non-punitive nature of the Illinois law according to the court.209
¶55
Residency restrictions, nevertheless, resemble banishment in important ways. First,
both penalties severely geographically limit the places where individuals may reside. For
example, a study in Oklahoma City, which has a 2000-foot protected zone around
schools, playgrounds, parks and childcare facilities, found that less than 16% of the city
was legally inhabitable by sex offenders, and most of that land was industrial and lacked
¶52

Court are in rough equipoise. . . . What tips the scale [in favor of upholding the Alaska law] is the
presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State‘s law. That presumption gives the
State the benefit of the doubt in close cases like this one, and on that basis alone I concur with the
Court‘s judgment.
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 110 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring).
200
State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1150 (Ind. 2009); Baker, 295 S.W.3d at 443.
201
Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
202
Id. at 97.
203
Id.
204
198 U.S. 253, 269–70 (1905) (Brewer, J. dissenting).
205
Id. at 269.
206
William Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of its use and a Proposal for its Abolition under the
First Amendment, 24 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 476 (1998).
207
Id. at 465.
208
People v. Morgan, 881 N.E.2d 507, 510–11 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 780
(Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
209
Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 780.
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residential housing.210 A recent Colorado study recommended against implementing
residency restrictions in that state claiming, ―in urban areas, a large number of schools
and childcare centers are located within various neighborhoods, leaving extremely
limited areas for sex offenders to reside if restrictions were implemented.‖211 A similar
study in Orange County, Florida, found that only 5% of the county‘s residential areas
were outside the prohibited buffer zone.212
¶56
Additionally, both penalties operate to deprive offenders of meaningful connections
to their communities. For example, a 2004 survey of Florida sex offenders found that
half of respondents reported being forced to move from a residence in which they had
been living due to that state‘s 1000-foot restricted zone around schools, parks,
playgrounds, public school bus stops, and areas where children congregate.213 As the
mother of a convicted Florida sex offender explained:
My husband and I wanted [our son] to come live with us for awhile, while
he got adjusted to life on the outside and got on his feet. He was not
allowed to do so because we live within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop.
So he had to go to a different county, where he had no support system. He
was placed in a dirty disgusting motel because it was the only place he
could find to live. It was next door to a XXX nudie place . . . . He was
very lonely and depressed . . . . He eventually started drinking again and
violated parole by staying out too late. 214
¶57

For this offender, and others like him, residency restrictions pose a significant
challenge in securing suitable housing. This challenge also creates a palpable threat to
the community because sex offenders who cannot find suitable housing become transient
and difficult to track. According to one Iowa sheriff, ―We are less safe as a community
now than we were before residency restrictions‖ because so many offenders have been
forced into transience by the Iowa law.215 Even for non-homeless offenders, residency
restrictions often push offenders away from the supervision, treatment, stability, and
supportive networks they need to build successful, law-abiding lives.216 In a 2005 survey
of Florida sex offenders, for example, half of respondents reported that residency
restrictions prevented them from living with a supportive family member,217 and 60% of
respondents said that residency restrictions created emotional suffering.218
210

Sean Murphy, Experts Say Sex Offender Zones Problematic, DAILY ARDMOREITE, Nov. 9, 2006.
SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., DIV. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLO. DEP‘T OF PUB. SAFETY, REPORT ON SAFETY
ISSUES RAISED BY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND LOCATION OF SEX OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY 4
(2004) [hereinafter REPORT ON SAFETY ISSUES], available at
http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsom/Sex_Offender/SO_Pdfs/FullSLAFinal01.pdf.
212
Paul A. Zandbergen & Timothy C. Hart, Reducing Housing Options for Convicted Sex Offenders:
Investigating the Impact on Residency Restriction Laws Using GIS, JUST. RES. & POL‘Y, Fall 2006, at 1,
available at
http://jrsa.metapress.com/content/k2530613xk34/?p=0df5202fd96848f68f99e8b7d785a5f7&pi=6.
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HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 102.
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Id. at 103.
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Id. at 10.
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Id. at 9.
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Jill S. Levenson, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: A Report to the Florida Legislature 4 (Oct. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ccoso.org/residencerestrictionsFL.pdf).
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¶58

Despite the difficulty many offenders face in finding suitable housing, most courts,
including those in Illinois, have concluded that residency restrictions are not akin to
banishment because some, albeit limited, housing is still available to offenders.219 The
Kentucky Supreme Court, however, came to the opposite conclusion, finding that state‘s
1000-foot restriction prevented offenders ―from residing in large areas of the
community.‖220 While recognizing that Kentucky‘s residency statute was not identical to
banishment because it still allowed offenders to visit prohibited areas, the court
nonetheless found that the law worked to ―expel[] registrants from their own homes, even
if their residency predated that statute or arrival of the school, daycare, or playground.‖221
Such a restriction was ―decidedly similar to banishment.‖222
¶59
Illinois sex offenders face similar challenges in finding suitable housing in the
state. Illinois currently imprisons 1000 sex offenders who have met their parole date but
cannot be released because they are unable to secure suitable housing.223 This lack of
suitable housing is due in part to the fact that Illinois‘ residency statute works in
conjunction with common preexisting neighborhood designs, which tend to center around
schools and playgrounds, thereby depriving child sex offenders of housing options.
Additionally, economic decline in once prosperous Illinois cities, like East St. Louis
where Patrick Leroy, the defendant in People v. Leroy, lived has led to a scarcity of safe,
affordable housing for all residents, not just for child sex offenders.224 As Judge Kuehn,
the lone dissenter in Leroy, explained:
The historical evolution of East St. Louis has resulted in a present-day
community that possesses a plethora of schools and playgrounds. At the
same time, there is a paucity of decent housing. The schools and
playgrounds are by-products of an economic expansion that East St. Louis
experienced immediately after the second world war. Countless factories
and manufacturing plants provided employment and grew East St. Louis
into a workingman‘s town . . . . The Eisenhower years presented a time
when a lot of East St. Louis children were in need of a lot of schools . . . .
Over the years that ensued, the manufacturing and production plants
would disappear, along with the families that once populated the town‘s
crowded neighborhoods. Nicely maintained middle-class homes became
slums, which were condemned and torn down . . . . Today, remaining
homes like the one Leroy was ordered to leave tend to cluster around areas
219

See cases cited supra note 169.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 444 (Ky. 2009).
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Twohey, supra note 6. According to Twohey, ―[s]ex offenders have long been prohibited from living in
households with children under 18 and within 500 feet of a school, park or child-care facility. A 2005 law
expanded the restrictions by prohibiting more than one sex offender from living under the same roof unless
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opposition. . . . The problem is, after serving parole behind bars these offenders are released into the
community with no supervision or transitional support.‖ Id. The article does not distinguish between child
sex offenders and other types of sex offenders.
224
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where schools still operate . . . . A number of former school buildings still
stand, despite their closure. Their adjoining playgrounds render the
surrounding neighborhoods off limits to the likes of Patrick Leroy.225
¶60

Despite the housing inadequacies confronting many child sex offenders, the
majority opinions of both Illinois court decisions failed to consider the impact that
neighborhood design and economic decline have on the residency options available to
child sex offenders in the state.226
¶61
Although residency restrictions share some similarities with banishment, the
Indiana Supreme Court took a different approach in its analysis of the first Smith factor.
Instead of analogizing Indiana‘s residency law to banishment, the court compared the law
to other types of restraints typically placed on probationers and parolees.227 Because
restricting where a probationer or parolee may live is a common condition of release, the
Indiana Supreme Court held that Indiana‘s residency law was akin to a traditional form of
punishment, namely supervised probation or parole. According to the court, this factor
alone favored treating the effects of the statute as punitive as applied to the offender in
the Indiana case.228
¶62
The success of any legal challenge to Illinois‘ residency law will turn, in part, on
the living patterns of those in compliance with the law. Unfortunately, there have been
no studies analyzing the impact of Illinois‘ residency law on child sex offenders in the
state. If offenders face severely limited housing options, which effectively isolate them
from their communities, then residency restrictions may be akin to the historical
punishment of banishment. This is especially true if banishment is understood to mean
expulsion from part, not all, of a community. This argument, however, has already been
rejected by two of Illinois‘ five appellate courts. Therefore, for a challenge to be
successful it must either arise in one of the three districts yet to consider the issue or,
alternatively, it must abandon the analogy to banishment and instead embrace the
reasoning employed by the Indiana Supreme Court.
3. Affirmative Disability or Restraint
¶63

The second Smith factor used to determine whether a particular law is so punitive
as to negate the legislature‘s civil intent is whether the statute in question imposes an
affirmative disability or restraint.229 Here, a reviewing court must evaluate how the
statute‘s effects are felt by its subjects.230 If the disability or restraint is minor or indirect,
the statute is unlikely to be punitive.231 In considering the second Smith factor, both
Illinois courts refused to allow the presence of a limited disability or restraint to sway
their ultimate conclusion that Illinois‘ residency law created a civil regime.232 Although
225
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the Leroy court ―would not characterize the disability or restraint imposed by [Illinois‘
residency statute] as minor or indirect,‖ it was ―not convinced that the presence of this
factor alone [was] sufficient to create a punitive effect from [the legislature‘s] nonpunitive purpose.‖233
¶64
The dissent in Leroy was ―completely at odds‖ with the majority‘s conclusion,
especially in light of the legal protections traditionally afforded to one‘s home.234
According to Judge Kuehn, ―Our history has always placed great emphasis upon, and
given great deference to, the place where an American chooses to live. The inalienable
rights that compose our most cherished values are inextricably tied to an American‘s
ability to settle, and to live, in a place of his or her choosing.‖235 Illinois residency law
―does not simply prohibit [convicted child sex offender] Patrick Leroy from living in
certain areas around this state . . . [it] effectively removes [him] from his lifelong
residence.‖236 Thus, ―the retroactive disability and restraint imposed by [Illinois‘
residency law] . . . directly infringes upon traditionally guarded freedoms and otherwise
protected personal liberties.‖237
¶65
Other courts have also held that residency laws impose an affirmative disability or
restraint on child sex offenders.238 The Indiana Supreme Court, for example, found the
disability or restraint imposed by that state‘s residency law to be ―neither minor nor
indirect,‖ due, in part, to the statute‘s failure to exempt offenders who established their
homes prior to a prohibited entity moving into their neighborhood.239 According to the
Indiana court, sex offenders are ―subject to constant eviction because there is no way for
[them] to find a permanent home in that there are no guarantees a school or youth
program center will not open within 1000 feet of any given location.‖240 As a result, the
second Smith factor ―clearly favor[ed]‖ treating the effects of the Indiana‘s residency law
as punitive as applied to the defendant in the Indiana case.241
¶66
The Kentucky Supreme Court also found it ―difficult to imagine that being
prohibited from residing within certain areas does not qualify as an affirmative disability
or restraint.‖242 The Kentucky court was concerned about the ―constant threat of
eviction‖ and ―collateral consequences‖ facing offenders under Kentucky‘s residency
law.243 According to the court, the Kentucky law ―could, for example, impact where an
offender‘s children attend school, access to public transportation for employment
purposes, access to drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs and even access to medical
care and residential nursing home facilities for the aging offender.‖244 As a result, the
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court had little difficulty concluding that Kentucky‘s residency law ―clearly impose[d]
affirmative disabilities and restraints upon registrants.‖245
¶67
Illinois challengers may have less work to do with this Smith factor because, while
Illinois courts viewed the restraint imposed by the state‘s residency law as non-punitive,
they nonetheless recognized that the law does operate as an affirmative disability or
restraint on child sex offenders.246 The challenge then is to convince a reviewing court
that this factor should be afforded sufficient weight to affect their overall analysis under
Smith.
4. Twin Aims of Punishment
¶68

The third factor a reviewing court will consider to determine whether the effects of
a law are punitive is whether the statute in question promotes either of the twin aims of
punishment: retribution or deterrence.247 The assumption underlying this Smith factor is
that if a statute promotes retribution or deterrence, it is more likely punitive than
regulatory.248 Reiterating the statute‘s public safety goals, the Illinois courts rejected the
possibility that Illinois‘ residency law inflicted retribution for past sex offenses.249
According to the Leroy court, ―the purpose of [Illinois‘ residency law is to] protect[]
children from known child sex offenders, and . . . [t]here is no evidence that [the law
was] designed as a form of retribution.‖250 In considering the deterrent effect of the
statute, the Leroy court noted that it was ―reasonable‖ to believe that Illinois‘ residency
law might deter future crimes by limiting the contact child sex offenders have with
children, but ―even an obvious deterrent purpose does not necessarily make a law
punitive.‖251 To hold otherwise, claimed the court, ―would severely undermine the
government‘s ability to engage in effective regulation.‖252
¶69
The Leroy court, however, seemed to focus its inquiry on whether the Illinois
legislature designed Illinois‘ residency statute to inflict retribution or deterrence, not
whether the application of the statute tends to promote either of the twin aims of
punishment. According to Judge Kuehn, one need only examine Patrick Leroy‘s
circumstances to understand how Illinois‘ residency law advances retribution.253 Leroy
was convicted in 1987 of criminal sexual assault.254 He served six years in prison and
upon his release returned to his childhood home to live with his aging mother. Besides
prison, this was the only home Leroy had ever known. For over a decade, Leroy lived
within 500 feet of an elementary school and never re-offended. In May 2003, authorities
discovered Leroy was violating of Illinois‘ residency law and forced him to move.
―Absent a tendency to promote retribution,‖ asked Judge Kuehn, ―what legitimate
purpose would legislators have in removing Patrick Leroy from his home, given the fact
245
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that he has lived there for 10 years without re-offending?‖255 According to Judge Kuehn,
a restriction, like Illinois‘ residency statute, ―imposed without consideration for the
likelihood of a particular offender to re-offend has to be grounded, at least in part, in
furtherance of retribution.‖256
¶70
The Kentucky Supreme Court was also concerned about the expansive nature of the
restriction. According to the court, ―When a restriction is imposed equally upon all
offenders, with no consideration given to how dangerous any particular registrant may be
to public safety, that restriction begins to look far more like retribution for past offenses
than a regulation intended to prevent future ones.‖257 Thus, by failing to make an
individualized assessment of the dangerousness of each offender, the Kentucky court
concluded that its state‘s statute promoted retribution, one of the traditional aims of
punishment.258
¶71
The Indiana Supreme Court, however, took a different approach, refusing to
address whether Indiana‘s residency statute promoted retribution and focusing instead on
the law‘s ―substantial‖ deterrent purpose.259 According to the court:
By prohibiting sex offenders from living in certain proscribed areas
[Indiana‘s] residency restriction statute is apparently designed to reduce
the likelihood of future crimes by depriving the offender of the
opportunity to commit those crimes. In this sense the statute is an even
more direct deterrent to sex offenders than the Act‘s registration and
notification regime.260
Thus, according to the Indiana court, the deterrent factor alone favored treating the statute
as punitive as applied to the offender in the Indiana case.261
¶72
The United States Supreme Court, however, has been hesitant to hold that the
presence of a deterrent purpose renders an otherwise civil statute punitive. According to
the Court, ―Any number of governmental programs might deter crime without imposing
punishment. To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such
sanctions criminal . . . would severely undermine the Government‘s ability to engage in
effective regulation.‖262 Furthermore, in upholding Alaska‘s sex offender registration
and community notification law, the Court stated that a ―statute is not deemed punitive
simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to
advance.‖263 As such, ―[t]he State‘s determination to legislate with respect to convicted
sex offenders as a class, rather than require individual determination of their
dangerousness, does not make the [Alaska registration and community notification]
statute a punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause.‖264
255
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Nevertheless, there is a strong argument that Illinois‘ residency statute promotes
the twin aims of punishment by failing to determine which child sex offenders are likely
to re-offend. By subjecting all child sex offenders to the same prohibition, regardless of
their crime or risk of re-offense, Illinois‘ residency law exacts retribution on those who
intend to abide by the law. Additionally, the Illinois law seeks to deter those offenders
who may re-offend by removing them from areas where children are present. This
obvious deterrent effect, however, does not appear to be enough for the United States
Supreme Court or for the two Illinois courts to consider this issue. As such, any effective
challenge to Illinois‘ residency law must rest on more than the third Smith factor alone.
5. Rational Relationship to a Non-Punitive Purpose

The next factor a reviewing court will weigh to determine whether Illinois‘
residency law amounts to retroactive punishment is whether the statute bears a rational
connection to a legitimate non-punitive purpose.265 Both Illinois courts to consider the
issue had little trouble concluding that Illinois‘ residency statute bore a rational
connection to the legitimate non-punitive purpose of protecting children from known
child sex offenders.266 The Indiana Supreme Court similarly found that its state‘s
residency statute had ―a purpose other than simply to punish sex offenders,‖ namely to
advance public safety.267 Both statutes, therefore, easily satisfied the fourth Smith factor.
¶75
The Kentucky Supreme Court focused instead on whether the connection between
Kentucky‘s residency statute and public safety was indeed rational.268 Noting that the
statute did little to prohibit offenders from actually interacting with children, it was
―difficult‖ for the court to see ―how public safety is enhanced by a registrant not being
allowed to sleep near a school at night, when children are not present, but being allowed
to stay there during the day, when children are present.‖269 Kentucky‘s residency law did
nothing to prohibit offenders from working with children, visiting schools and
playgrounds while children were present, or living with children, including their
victims.270 The Kentucky court therefore concluded that its state‘s statute might bear a
connection to public safety, but ―the statute‘s inherent flaws prevent that connection from
being ‗rational.‘‖271
¶76
Judge Kuehn echoed the Kentucky court‘s conclusion. According to Judge Kuehn,
Illinois‘ residency law ―inhibits nothing‖ because child sex offenders can still reside close
¶74

individualized assessment required by the Alaska statute.
The fact that the Act uses past crime as the touchstone, probably sweeping in a significant number
of people who pose no real threat to the community, serves to feed suspicion that something more
than regulation of safety is going on; when a legislature uses prior convictions to impose burdens
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enough to children to tempt their desires.272 Offenders ―can live just outside the
restricted area, gaze out their kitchen window, and covet the children that they see
playing on a school playground some 500 feet away.‖273 The arbitrary nature of the
restriction, coupled with its inability to prohibit offenders from interacting with children,
made Illinois‘ residency statute ―pointless‖ in the eyes of the Leroy dissent.274
¶77
Recent studies also indicate that residency restrictions do nothing to prohibit sex
offenders from re-offending. For example, a 2005 report to the Florida legislature
concluded that ―there is no evidence that proximity to schools increases recidivism, or,
conversely, that housing restrictions reduce re-offending or increase community
safety.‖275 A 2004 Colorado study, which examined a random sample of sex offenders
on probation in the Denver area, found that offenders did not cluster in areas where
children were present, and concluded that residency restrictions ―should not be
considered as a method to control sexual offending recidivism.‖276 A similar 2003
Minnesota study found no correlation between the residential location of that state‘s sex
offenders and their likelihood to re-offend.277 According to scholar Asmara TekleJohnson, ―In the face of empirical data evidencing that [residency restrictions] are
ineffective and grossly over inclusive, the fit between [residency restrictions] and an
alleged non-punitive purpose of public safety is beyond irrational.‖278
¶78
Notwithstanding recent empirical data, the rationality factor may be a difficult
obstacle for those challenging Illinois‘ residency law to overcome. First, rationality is a
low standard to meet.279 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court considered the
fourth Smith factor ―a [m]ost significant‖ element in its determination that the effects of
Alaska‘s SORA‘s were non-punitive and therefore constitutional under the federal Ex
Post Facto Clause.280 The arguments advanced by the Kentucky Supreme Court,281
therefore, may prove more effective when considered within the context of the final
Smith factor discussed next.
6. Excessive in Relation to Non-Punitive Purpose
¶79

Finally, a restriction may amount to punishment under Smith if it is excessive with
respect to the state‘s non-punitive purpose.282 A court weighing this factor must
determine whether the regulatory means are reasonable in light of the state‘s non-punitive
objective.283 In applying the last Smith factor, both Illinois courts concluded that Illinois‘
272
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residency statute set forth a reasonable method by which to promote public safety, and
the law was not excessive in relation to its non-punitive goal for two reasons.284 First,
when compared to the thirteen other states with residency restrictions at the time, Illinois‘
500-foot restriction was the least restrictive in geographical terms.285 Additionally, while
the statute ―restrict[ed] residency to some extent, it [did] not otherwise restrict the
movement and activities of child sex offenders.‖286 As such, the law bore a reasonable
relationship to the non-punitive purpose of protecting children from known child sex
offenders, and set forth a reasonable means by which to accomplish that goal.287
¶80
The Illinois decisions rested on the assumption that restricting sex offenders‘
proximity to children would reduce their likelihood to re-offend. Underlying this
assumption is the common belief that sex offenders re-offend at an unusually high rate,
and therefore require special attention to prevent recidivism.288 Both assumptions,
however, are disputed by research.
¶81
First, studies suggest that sex offenders do not re-offend at an unusually high rate
and may actually be less likely to re-offend than other criminals.289 For example, a 1998
meta-study of 61 sex offender recidivism studies concluded that, ―[o]n average, the
sexual offense recidivism rate was low‖ for sex offenders.290 The study found recidivism
rate for rapists and child molesters, arguably the two most despised sex offender groups,
was 18.9% and 12.7%, respectively.291 Furthermore, regulating where sex offenders may
legally reside does little to prevent individuals from re-offending. A 2007 study by the
Minnesota Department of Corrections, which analyzed the re-offense patters of 224 sex
offenders released from prison between 1990 and 2002, found that residential proximity
to children had very little impact on the offender‘s opportunity to re-offend.292 Just over
half of the recidivists came into contact with their victim through ―social or relationship
proximity,‖ not by living near the victim or living near places the victim frequents.293
Additionally, residency restrictions do little to limit the risk posed by family members,
acquaintances and friends; people who perpetrate an overwhelming majority of sexual
offenses.294 A 2000 DOJ study found that only 7% of child sex victims reported being
abused by strangers.295 The remaining 93% of victims knew their offenders, 34.2% of
whom were family members, and 58.7% of whom were acquaintances.296
¶82
Recent research also demonstrates that individualized risk factors can help predict
which offenders are most likely to re-offend. For example, a 2004 meta-analysis of
284
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ninety-five studies involving more than 31,000 sex offenders found that factors such as
negative family background, problems with friends and lovers, and deviant sexual
interests are important predictors of sexual recidivism.297 Other research demonstrates
that dynamic risk factors, such as unemployment, isolation, depression and instability can
predict the likelihood of re-offense.298 The study concluded that ―[i]nterventions directed
towards the highest risk offenders are most likely to contribute to the public safety.‖299
¶83
Given the limited effect residency restrictions have on reducing recidivism,
applying them to all child sex offenders, regardless of risk, seems excessive. This is
particularly true considering the indefinite nature of Illinois‘ residency law. It was this
lack of individual assessment, in part, that led the Indiana Supreme Court to hold its
state‘s residency law unconstitutional.300 According to the court, the law failed to
―consider the seriousness of the crime, the relationship between the victim and the
offender, or [make] an initial determination of the risk of re-offending.‖ 301 As such, by
―[r]estricting the residency of offenders . . . without considering whether a particular
offender is a danger to the general public, the statute exceeds its non-punitive
purposes.‖302
¶84
Like Indiana‘s residency statute, Illinois‘ law fails to account for individualized
risk factors, which can be important predictors of recidivism. In addition, despite
applying only to child sex offenders, both the Illinois and Indiana statutes capture
offenders who have not committed a sex offense against a child.303 The Illinois law, for
example, applies to individuals who commit kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping,
unlawful restraint, and aggravated unlawful restraint, when the victim is under eighteen
years of age and the defendant is not a parent of the victim.304 As previously discussed,
Illinois‘ SORA contains the same provision, but SORA‘s provision applies only to
offenses deemed ―sexually motivated.‖305 Illinois‘ residency statute has no such
provision, applying to sexual and non-sexual crimes alike. A combination of these
factors, namely the ineffectiveness of residency restrictions in preventing re-offense, the
lack of individualized risk assessment, and the broad definition of ―sex offender,‖
coupled with the constant threat of eviction, led both the Indiana and Kentucky Supreme
Courts to conclude that their state‘s respective residency restrictions were excessive when
297
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considered in light of their public safety purpose.306 Any challenge to Illinois‘ residency
law, therefore, must emphasize these factors if it hopes to be successful.
B. Need for Judicial Intervention given the Resurgence of the Preventive State
¶85

The resurgence of preventive lawmaking in recent years has many observers
concerned, and with good reason. Preventive lawmaking not only threatens the liberty
interests of disfavoured groups, but it also presents a slippery slope with few principled
limits. According to Janus, sex offender laws ―provide a template for an expansive
version of the preventive state‖ by legitimizing outsider jurisprudence.307 Outsider
jurisprudence is the belief that the state may single out groups of ―others‖ for inferior
legal treatment.308 In the past, the state has attempted to distinguish a group based on the
physical characteristics of its members—by race, gender, or disability.309 But today,
modern outsider jurisprudence thrives on the belief that the risky person is different at
some basic level than the rest of the population; and the new outsider status is based on
risk of dangerousness, not physical traits.310
¶86
Historically, outsider status has been used to justify everything from slavery, to the
forced sterilization of ―mental defectives,‖311 to the internment of Japanese Americans
during World War II.312 Once a group is labelled as ―other,‖ and their threat considered
sufficiently great, there is little to prevent lawmakers from curtailing the civil liberties of
members. Thus, one significant problem with the resurgence of outsider jurisprudence,
according to Janus, is that it ―places no principled limits on the degradation of rights for
the outside group.‖313
¶87
More concerning still is the complete lack of political will to resist or question the
re-emergence of outsider jurisprudence, at least as it pertains to sex offenders. According
to The Economist, this lack of political will is not surprising given the political ―ratchet
effect‖ that accompanies most sex offender laws. In describing the ―ratchet effect,‖ The
Economist states that:
Stricter curbs on paedophiles win votes. And to sound severe, such curbs
must be stronger than the laws in place, which in turn were proposed by
politicians who wished to appear tough themselves.314 . . . [As a result,
e]very lawmaker who wants to sound tough on sex offenders has to
propose a law tougher than the one enacted by the last politician who
wanted to sound tough on sex offenders.315 . . . Few politicians dare to
306
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vote against such laws, because if they do, the attack ads practically write
themselves.316
Illinois has witnessed its own ―ratchet effect‖ in the twenty-four years since
HCSORA‘s inception. During that time, Illinois lawmakers have routinely cited the risk
of recidivism as one justification for the state‘s increasingly harsh sex offender regulatory
scheme. Lawmakers have claimed, for example, that ―recidivism is a real problem with
these people,‖317 and that sex offenders are ―compulsive and repetitive‖318 and have
―never been cured.‖319 By using the risk of recidivism as a key marker of ―otherness,‖
Illinois lawmakers have not only preyed on the fears of the public, but they have also
harnessed the legitimacy of science and medicine to reinforce the alleged deviance of the
outsider group. According to Janus, ―risk-assessment is seen as an expert endeavour, one
that is increasingly seen as scientific.‖320 As a result, ―dangerousness serves as a stable
ingredient of the person . . . [an] internal characteristic . . . that justifies both the
prediction of future behaviour and the creation of outsider status.‖321 The resulting
classification, therefore, appears ―natural and inevitable‖ and completely ―untainted by
the invidious prejudice‖ that in fact drives the classification.322
¶89
As Part II demonstrated, residency restrictions are simply the latest in a long line of
preventive measures designed to limit the alleged dangerousness of child sex offenders in
the state. Although recent research demonstrates that residency restrictions do little to
prevent crime323 and may actually do more harm than good,324 the public‘s strong disdain
of sex offenders provides little incentive for politicians to change. Any call for restraint,
therefore, must originate with the court.
¶90
To date, however, Illinois courts have been reluctant to overturn Illinois‘ regulatory
scheme, upholding both SORA and SOCNL against constitutional challenges. This
outcome is not surprising given the courts‘ general failure to consider the impact of the
law within the larger context of the preventive state. According to Steiker,
¶88

Courts and commentators often tend to conclude, too quickly, that if some
policy or practice is not ‗really‘ punishment, then there is nothing wrong
with it . . . . Not only do courts and commentators often trivialize
objections to actions of a ‗merely‘ preventive (as opposed to punitive)
state, they also do not tend to see the various preventive policies and
practices . . . as part of a unified problem . . . . Rather, each individual
preventive practice has been treated as sui generis rather than as a facet of
a larger question in need of a more general conceptual framework.325
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¶91

The Illinois courts, however, may soon be faced with an opportunity to re-evaluate
the legitimacy of the preventive state. As Part III showed, a viable challenge to Illinois‘
residency statute exists under the ex post facto clauses of both the United States and
Illinois Constitutions. For the Illinois Supreme Court, and the three Illinois Appellate
Courts yet to consider the issue, such a challenge provides an opportunity to place a
principled limit on the power of the preventive state. Given the laundry list of regulations
confronting child sex offenders today, any thorough constitutional review of Illinois‘
residency statute must consider the proper role of the preventive state. Namely, to what
extent should the constitutional limits designed to cabin the powers of the punitive state
apply to laws aimed at preventing crime?
¶92
Additionally, the Illinois courts should also consider the underlying purpose of Ex
Post Facto Clauses. A close examination of Illinois‘ residency law demonstrates that it
clearly fails the three policies the Ex Post Facto Clauses were designed to protect. First,
by applying to all child sex offenders, regardless of conviction date, Illinois‘ residency
law deprives offenders convicted prior to the statute‘s effective date of fair warning of the
law‘s effect. Additionally, by retroactively changing the penalties associated with certain
crimes, Illinois‘ residency law frustrates reliance on existing laws in general. Most
importantly, Illinois‘ residency law is the result of a largely unchecked political process,
which has thrived on the perceived ―otherness‖ of an unpopular group. This political
―ratchet effect‖ has left child sex offenders with little recourse, and is precisely this type
of unchecked legislative power that the Ex Post Facto Clauses were designed to prevent.
IV. CONCLUSION
¶93

Residency restrictions are the latest wave in a continuing effort by lawmakers to
respond to public concern about the presence of sex offenders in the state. In their rush to
appease the public, however, lawmakers have failed to consider the long-term impact of
their chosen regulatory scheme. The resurgence of preventive lawmaking is cause for
concern; not only for sex offenders, but for all citizens, because a government without
principled limits is one of limitless power. Residency restrictions are not an effective
means of preventing crime. More importantly, they violate the basic notions of fairness
that the Constitution was designed to protect. Although two of Illinois‘ five appellate
courts have upheld Illinois‘ residency statute against ex post facto challenges, recent
decisions in other states may signal a change in the judicial landscape. The time has
come for the Illinois Supreme Court to check the powers of the preventive state, and hold
residency restrictions unconstitutional.
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